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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental 
philosophy of science. We examine variability in the philosophical 
views of scientists. Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we 
analyze scientists’ responses to prompts on philosophical issues 
(methodology, confirmation, values, reality, reductionism, and 
motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the 
philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social 
and behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which 
differences arose, with several more that look promising for future 
research. We then evaluate the difference between the natural and 
social sciences and the challenge of interdisciplinary integration 
across scientific branches. 
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 Introduction 
Experimental philosophy has made great strides in several areas, including 
epistemology and ethics, but one area that has received less attention is philosophy 
of science. Of the scant experimental philosophy of science produced so far, the 
focus has been primarily on specific scientific concepts, entities, or properties, such 
as genes (Stotz, Griffiths, and Knight ; Griffiths and Stotz ) or innateness 
(Griffitsh, Machery, and Linquist ; Knobe and Samuels ). (For a review, 
see (Machery ).) Already a clarion call has sounded for more experimental work 
in philosophy of science (Stotz b, a; Weinberg and Crowley ; 
Nagatsu ; Machery ). We concur and also believe that the scope of this 
work should be extended. To these ends, we endeavor to develop and extend 
experimental philosophy of science by engaging in philosophical cartography. Using 
data gathered by the Toolbox Dialogue Initiative (TDI),1 we attempt to illuminate 
some of the general contours of a map of the philosophical attitudes of practicing 
scientists and then use this map to contribute to current work in the philosophy of 
science on interdisciplinary integration.  
An experimentally informed map of philosophical attitudes of scientists is 
philosophically interesting for several reasons. First, distinguishing between the 
natural and social sciences has been a topic of discussion in philosophy of science 
for decades now. Ian Hacking (), for example, offers a complex distinction 
between the two, claiming that the classificatory practices of the social sciences 
                                               
1 Formerly the Toolbox Project (http://tdi.msu.edu/). 
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interact with the world in a way not found in the natural sciences. Call something 
an electron and it makes no differences to it; diagnosing people with narcissism can 
change how they behave. (For more on Hacking’s proposal, see (Martínez ).) 
Developing a map of the philosophical attitudes of scientists can inform projects 
like Hacking’s. For instance, if the classificatory practices of the social and natural 
sciences work as Hacking proposes, we should expect social scientists to have more 
antirealist sympathies than natural scientists. This is a testable prediction. If it were 
to bear out, and thus make an appearance on our collective map of scientists’ 
philosophical attitudes, Hacking’s proposal would gain a consideration in its favor. 
In this paper, we develop the beginnings of such a map. We do so experimentally 
by basing our claims on a survey of scientists’ own reports of their attitudes 
regarding various issues, rather than by appeal to our own intuitions or a 
philosophical analysis of the literatures of various sciences. This survey-driven 
approach allows us to capture heterogeneity across different areas of sciences, 
something that can elude traditional intuition- and literature-based methods in 
philosophy of science (Faust and Meehl ; Griffiths and Stotz ; Machery 
and Cohen ; Steel, Gonnerman, and O’Rourke ).2 
Second, experimental examination of scientists’ philosophical attitudes 
opens a new avenue into the existing discussion of interdisciplinary integration in 
philosophy of science. One prominent focus of philosophers of science has been on 
integration as a relation between various scientific objects, such as theories, fields, 
or specialties (Bechtel ; Darden and Maull ; Gerson ; Grantham ; 
Griesemer ). Nagel’s ()reductionist account of scientific theories can be 
seen as an early entry into this literature. More recently, as skepticism has grown 
about this reductive project, some (Mitchell et al. ; Brigandt ; Love ) 
                                               
2 The traditional literature-based methods that we have in mind are ones 
where the philosopher engages very deeply with a subset of the scientific 
literature, especially literature which she deems relevant and read in depth. As 
Machery (2016) explains, bibliometric and cliometric techniques provide 
philosophers with other ways of exploring scientific literatures.  
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have proposed a non-reductive conception of integration according to which the 
ideas and explanations of various disciplines are integrated “to yield an overall 
explanation of a complex phenomenon” (Brigandt , ).  
Drawing inputs from different disciplines provides reason to believe that 
integration of this sort is distinctly philosophical in character (O’Rourke, Crowley, 
and Gonnerman ). Disciplines engage with the world in different ways, 
foregrounding certain problems while leaving others in the background. This sort 
of engagement can be modeled in terms of a discipline’s research worldview, 
comprised of a system of core beliefs, values, and practices (O’Rourke and Crowley 
). These worldviews differ in various ways, such as in the meaning of terms used 
to articulate them (Bracken and Oughton ; S. M. Donovan, O’Rourke, and 
Looney ). The task of interdisciplinary integration typically requires combining 
inputs that reflect these worldviews, and differences among worldviews can 
complicate this task, especially since they can be fundamental and hard to see. As 
Eigenbrode et al. explain, “Scientists collaborating within disciplines tend to share 
fundamental assumptions and values concerning the scientific process and, 
habitually, may discuss them little, but the failure to understand and address these 
fundamental differences can impede progress in cross-disciplinary efforts” (, 
). Since the fundamental assumptions that compose disciplinary worldviews are 
partly metaphysical and epistemological in nature (O’Rourke and Crowley ), 
philosophy can contribute to studies of interdisciplinarity integration by 
investigating these assumptions. By experimentally examining philosophical 
commitments or attitudes of practicing scientists, we gain a better understanding of 
the nature, mechanisms, and challenges of integration in interdisciplinary science.  
This study explores a large data set generated by TDI (Eigenbrode et al. 
; S. M. Donovan, O’Rourke, and Looney ). Since , over  TDI (or 
“Toolbox”) workshops have been conducted worldwide to enhance mutual 
understanding, communication, and collaboration among members of 
interdisciplinary groups. After canvassing several issues in experimental philosophy 
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of science in section , we offer detailed descriptions of these Toolbox workshops 
and the data they generate in section . In section  we present of our results. Then 
in section  we discuss those results, emphasizing what they mean for the distinction 
between the natural and the social sciences and for the challenge of interdisciplinary 
integration in the sciences.  
 Experimental philosophy of science 
Our initial step toward developing experimental philosophy of science involves 
defending the validity and effectiveness of empirical methods in philosophy of 
science. Experimental philosophy is a recent and growing movement that employs 
the systematic collection and analysis of empirical data as means for philosophical 
investigation. A central tenet of this movement is that philosophical arguments 
often make, entail, or presuppose empirical claims, and, as such, the strength of these 
arguments can be judged, in part, by collecting and analyzing empirical data that 
bear on those claims. Experimental philosophers have moved into a wide range of 
philosophical debates in metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology (Knobe et al. ; 
Sytsma and Livengood ; Machery ). Yet almost ironically, the field of 
experimental philosophy of science has received little development (Machery ). 
Stotz (a, b) and Weinberg and Crowley () outline some of 
the basic theoretical motivations for experimental philosophy of science. They assert 
that philosophy of science should be informed by how scientists conceive of and 
practice science. For this reason—as most contemporary philosophers would 
agree—philosophy of science that is conducted purely “from the armchair” with 
little awareness of actual scientists, scientific practices, and scientific findings is, at 
least prima facie, of dubious value. In our view, this common starting point for much 
of contemporary philosophy of science paves the way for the use of empirical data 
in philosophy of science. 
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The idea that philosophy of science can profit from empirical data about 
science is hardly novel. It is exemplified in the work of those who take what Bird 
(2008) calls “the historical turn in the philosophy of science.” We also see it in 
works that use case studies to advance philosophical claims about science or its areas 
such as biology. A central distinction between experimental philosophy of science 
and these approaches, however, is the proposal that philosophy of science can also 
benefit from empirical analysis about how scientists think and behave. As Thagard 
notes, “Science is a human enterprise, and understanding the development of 
scientific knowledge depends on an account of the thought processes of humans” 
(1988, 4). A central focus of experimental philosophy of science, then, should be 
the systematic collection and analysis of empirical data pertaining to scientific 
thought processes and practices. And where the existing empirical record about 
how scientists think and behave is too thin, philosophers should feel free to gather 
the data themselves, using appropriate methods, of course, and possibly in 
collaboration with practicing scientists.3 
In addition to data regarding the views and practices of actual scientists, 
another source of data could be relevant. Feist notes that “Scientific thought and 
behavior are not limited to scientists per se but also encompass thought processes 
of children, adolescents, and adults who are simulating scientific problem solving 
and developing mental models of how the world works” (Fiest , ). 
Experimental philosophy can gather and interpret data from either trained 
scientists or ordinary folk without specialized scientific training. This difference in 
data source corresponds to the difference between experimental philosophy of 
                                               
3 Work exists in nearby orbits, such as the cognitive sciences of science 
(Carruthers, Stich, and Siegal ; Proctor and Capaldi ; Feist and Gorman 
). Some of this work draws philosophical conclusions about science from 
empirical data, systematically collected and analyzed (Grover ; Houts ; 
Wagenknecht, Nersessian, and Andersen ). For us, such work qualifies as 
experimental philosophy of science, even if the researchers don’t use the term. 
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science narrowly or broadly construed. Both kinds of research are represented in 
what little experimental philosophy of science currently exists. As examples of 
narrow experimental philosophy of science, Stotz et al. () and Griffiths and 
Stotz () examine scientists’ conceptions of genes. Griffiths et al. () and 
Linquist et al. (), alternatively, engage in a broader form of experimental 
philosophy of science by examining views on innateness and human nature 
(respectively) held by non-scientists. Knobe and Samuels () combine the two 
by examining the views on innateness held by both scientists and non-scientists.  
In all of these manifestations, the commitment of experimental philosophy 
of science to the relevance of empirical data is fundamentally naturalistic. Despite 
debate about its details, the naturalist idea that the methods of philosophy are of a 
piece with the methods of science figures importantly into the background of these 
views (Papineau ; Hartner ). That experimental philosophy of science is 
naturalistic should come as no surprise; what might be surprising, though, is the 
claim that philosophical aspects of science should be sensitive to data on the 
attitudes of scientists, including their philosophical attitudes. We contend that, 
without these data, philosophical claims about, for example, the roles of values in 
science or the epistemic standing of various methods will ignore a critical 
determinant of how values inflect actual scientific judgments, decisions, and 
behaviors and how methods are selected in examining specific research questions 
(Steel, Gonnerman, and O’Rourke 2017). To some extent, data about these 
philosophical attitudes may be gleaned from a close acquaintance with scientists 
and their publications. But any such acquaintance is likely to be non-systematic and 
non-representative, thereby providing an insufficient basis from which to draw 
philosophical conclusions about science (Faust and Meehl 2002; Griffiths and Stotz 
2008; Machery and Cohen 2012). A better way to uncover these attitudes is to 
deploy experimental methods, especially those of the social sciences. Of course, 
experimentally examining the philosophical attitudes of practicing scientists 
(specifically those relevant to philosophical reasoning about science) does not entail 
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that philosophers should defer to the philosophical perspectives of scientists. 
Rather, the success of experimental philosophy of science requires combining 
appreciation for conceptual dimensions of science with details about how science 
actually works. 
 Method 
We seek to expand experimental philosophy of science by engaging in it, specifically 
by experimentally probing for philosophical differences among scientific branches 
by examining the philosophical commitments of scientists who belong to those 
branches. To do this, we looked at  Toolbox workshops that were conducted with 
interdisciplinary research teams.4 These workshops were conducted between March 
 and October ; they had  participants ( female), who ranged from 
graduate students to senior researchers with over twenty years of research 
experience. 
At the start of these workshops, participants receive the STEM (Science-
Technology-Engineering-Mathematics) Toolbox instrument, which consists of six 
modules focusing on scientifically relevant philosophical issues and concludes with 
a page asking for demographic data. Each module contains four to five related 
prompts,  total (Looney et al. )5 in response to which participants either 
report agreement or disagreement on a five-point Likert scale ranging from  
(Disagree) to  (Agree) or select “Don’t know” or “N/A.”6 These last two options 
allow participants alternate responses to the Likert scale, thereby minimizing 
                                               
4 Dataset available online: 
https://mfr.osf.io/render?url=https://osf.io/ytpnw/?action=download%26mode=re
nder 
5 Full instrument available at https://goo.gl/ggSq 
6 Each module concludes with a “similar views” prompt, which asks 
participants to evaluate how similar the views among the group are for that module. 
We have excluded these prompts from the present analysis. 
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artificial clustering around the midpoint of the scale for cases of ignorance or non-
applicability. The demographic page includes four numbered spaces in which 
participants are asked to describe their disciplinary “identity.” By analyzing 
participants’ self-reported disciplinary identity in conjunction with their responses 
to these prompts, as we explain in section , we can look for philosophical 
differences across branches of science.7 
Two preliminary tasks were required before searching the data for 
philosophical differences. First, we needed to assign participants to academic 
disciplines. We began by examining the discipline(s) listed on the demographics 
page. Since these responses were open-ended, there was considerable variability in 
the discipline(s) listed. Some provided a single discipline; others gave several. Some 
responded quite generally (e.g., "biology"), while others responded very specifically 
(e.g., "fluvial geomorphology"). The question was how to categorize participants 
into disciplines and larger academic branches (groups of disciplines, such as 
Engineering, Arts & Humanities, and Life Sciences) given this variability. This 
presented two challenges: selecting a disciplinary taxonomy to use in assigning 
participants to disciplines and interpreting participant responses in light of that 
taxonomy. 
For the first challenge, we selected the Digital Commons Three-Tiered 
Taxonomy of Academic Disciplines (Bepress ) because the large degree of 
categorical resolution it offered made it easier to accommodate the wide variety of 
                                               
7 Workshops start with a preamble from the workshop facilitator (a TDI 
member), followed by participants completing a Toolbox instrument. They then 
engage in a semi-structured dialogue based on the prompts, with the goal of helping 
them to see their common research problem through each other’s eyes (Looney et 
al. ). After the dialogue, participants complete the instrument a second time to 
assess how their views may have shifted during the dialogue. For this study, we only 
examined the pre-dialogue responses, since our goal is to explore the philosophical 
attitudes of scientists taken as representatives of their disciplines, which we take to 
be better represented by their attitudes prior to the Toolbox dialogue. 
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disciplinary self-identifications reported by workshop participants. The Digital 
Commons taxonomy is regularly updated based on user feedback and developed 
using entries from multiple sources, such as The University of California’s list of 
departments and the Taxonomy of Research Doctoral Programs from the National 
Academies. At the time of analysis, the Digital Commons taxonomy comprised 
over  unique disciplinary categories broken into three tiers that we’ll refer to as 
academic branches, disciplines, and specializations. To illustrate, Philosophy is a 
discipline in the academic branch of Arts and Humanities, with specializations 
including Metaphysics, Feminist Philosophy, and Philosophy of Science. (The 
Digital Commons taxonomy’s third tier of specializations was especially useful for 
interpreting highly specific disciplinary identifications employed by Toolbox 
participants in their disciplinary self-identifications.) The top-tier of academic 
branches for the Digital Commons taxonomy consists of the following categories: 
Architecture, Arts and Humanities, Business, Education, Engineering, Law, Life 
Sciences, Medicine & Health Sciences, Physical Sciences & Mathematics, and 
Social & Behavioral Sciences. For this paper, we focused only on those researchers 
in the scientific branches: Life Sciences, Physical Sciences & Mathematics, and 
Social & Behavioral Sciences. As explained below, our focus on these branches was 
in part due to the number of participants in each branch.  
The second challenge concerned interpreting participants’ disciplinary self-
identifications in light of the Digital Commons taxonomy, a task complicated by 
demographic pages often containing multiple disciplinary specifications. In 
describing their disciplinary identity, most participants ( of , .%) provided 
at least two disciplines, such as “() algorithmics () microbial ecology () discrete 
math.” For the sake of categorizing participants into academic branches and 
disciplines, we only looked at the first discipline reported for two reasons. First, we 
are interested in researcher’s primary disciplinary identity, and we operated on the 
assumption that participants entered this discipline first. Second, it was not possible 
to look beyond the first discipline for everyone, since .% participants only listed 
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one discipline. We thus opted to err on the side of caution by abstaining from 
drawing on secondary disciplines listed to inform judgments about disciplinary 
identity.  
After meeting the challenges associated with the first preliminary task, we 
turned to the second, which was to clarify the nature of the differences that could 
be revealed by the STEM Toolbox instrument. This task was complicated by the 
number of dimensions of potential difference that the instrument was designed to 
reveal. The STEM instrument includes prompts such as “Objectivity implies an 
absence of values by the researcher,” and “Validation of evidence requires 
replication.” It was designed in an explicitly philosophical fashion, with half of its 
prompts classified as epistemological and half as metaphysical (Eigenbrode et al. ; 
O’Rourke and Crowley ). The epistemology prompts are divided into those that 
concern a scientist’s motivation for participating in research, those that concern the 
methods used in conducting research, and those that concern identifying when 
conclusions have been reached. The metaphysics prompts are organized into those 
that concern the nature of reality, the structure of reality (and in particular, 
reductionism and emergence), and values.8 
The STEM instrument’s prompts also distinguish between how scientists 
view their own work and how they view science more broadly. In doing so, the 
prompts help isolate important determinants of a scientist’s identity and place them 
in the context of a broader construal of scientific practice. Of the  prompts that 
we examine,  are reflexive prompts that express characteristics that some regard as 
fundamental to their own research (e.g., “My research typically isolates the behavior 
of individual components of a system”), and  are prompts that are not limited to 
one’s own research. Of these  prompts, the context of interpretation varies. For 
                                               
8 The values prompts reflect concerns with values in science, and so 
address axiological or value-theoretic concerns. See Eigenbrode et al. (2007) for 
why these were included in the Metaphysics half of the instrument. 
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example, two focus specifically on cross-disciplinary research, six use the adjective 
‘scientific’ explicitly to frame interpretation, and five explicitly mention research 
without modifying it with ‘scientific’. The balance talk about aspects of research 
without mentioning a context. Since this instrument is called the “Scientific 
Research Toolbox Instrument” and is deployed in workshop settings with 
interdisciplinary science teams, the expectation is that the participants will interpret 
the  non-reflexive prompts as pertaining to research that is scientific and that 
extends beyond one’s own practice.  
Thematically, the eight reflexive prompts address aspects of science and 
scientific research practices that apply across multiple research projects, such as the 
methods one primarily uses or the ontological character of one’s subject matter, with 
one prompt addressing the collective project of the workshop participants (viz., “The 
importance of our project stems from its applied aspects”). The  remaining 
prompts are more heterogeneous. Some offer provocative analyses of concepts that 
some take to be central to science, such as objectivity or advocacy. A second group 
orients workshop participants to certain visions of scientific explanation and 
scientific practice (e.g., “Value-neutral scientific research is possible”). Additional 
prompts express views about what must be true for a practice to count as science 
(e.g., “Scientific research must be hypothesis driven”), while still others address the 
values of particular scientists (e.g., “The principal value of research stems from the 
potential application of the knowledge gained”). This set of  prompts is unified 
in reflecting different ways of thinking about science, including its structure and 
function. 
In indicating their agreement or disagreement with each prompt, 
participants reveal (in some cases perhaps only indirectly) how they practice science 
or how they think science should be practiced. All the prompts (but one) abstract 
away from specific research contexts and projects, allowing participants to 
understand them in the context of science as they practice it and view it. In 
responding to them, participants are asked to adopt the primary disciplinary 
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perspective they assume in their research, and because of this, the responses can be 
understood as articulating commitments that frame one’s research approach, either 
affirmatively or negatively.9 Together, the STEM instrument’s prompts can be seen 
as partly mapping an investigator’s research worldview (or at least the more 
cognitive aspects of it), which may be understood as a set of “more or less tacit beliefs 
held by researchers about what they are studying and how to study it, as well as 
views about the nature of the output of their inquiry”(O’Rourke and Crowley , 
). When taken together, the maps that emerge for workshop participants 
display the topography of agreement and disagreement across a range of 
philosophical issues that some view as fundamental to scientific inquiry and that 
illuminate aspects of a scientist’s identity. Each map is systematic but skeletal, 
highlighting a few attitudes about the philosophical dimensions of science, 
sometimes fairly directly (as in the broader prompts about science) and sometimes 
more indirectly (as in the reflexive prompts). More technically, the prompts elicit, 
directly or indirectly, commitments about the metaphysical, epistemological, and 
axiological dimensions of science that often frame how one understands and 
practices science.  
 Results 
                                               
9 This instruction is motivated by the fact that many participants have 
complex disciplinary identities that could issue in different responses to the 
prompts, depending on which part of their identity is emphasized. (See the 
discussion above of the disciplines listed on the demographic page.) The 
workshop facilitator delivers the instruction in the workshop preamble as it is 
articulated in the text in order to provide consistent guidance to participants in 
responding to the prompts. Despite this instruction, over the next couple sections, 
we assume that workshop participants interpret the broader science prompts as 
claims about scientific research in general; however, an anonymous referee 
helpfully pointed out that they could interpret them as more localized claims 
about their own particular kinds of scientific research, e.g., social scientific 
research or natural scientific research. In the Discussion section, we respond to 
this concern. 
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Using participant self-reports of disciplinary identity, two of the authors served as 
raters to categorize participants into academic branches, using the Digital 
Commons Three-Tiered Taxonomy of Academic Disciplines (Bepress )10 The 
two raters first agreed to exclude  participants for providing responses that were 
clearly not research disciplines (such as “grant administration”). After 
independently coding an academic branch for each participant, the two raters then 
compared their results. Cohen’s Kappa determined a relatively high degree of 
correspondence (k = .), with the raters differing on  participants (out of ). 
Of these, they resolved their disagreement for all but  participants, who were then 
excluded from further analysis. 11 The results are summarized in Table .  
Life Sciences (LS) 134 
Physical Sciences & Mathematics (PSM) 72 
Social & Behavioral Sciences (SBS) 58 
Engineering  34 
Medicine and Health Sciences  17 
Arts and Humanities  8 
Education  10 
Business  2 
Table . Summary of participants’ academic branches as determined by two raters.  
As Table  indicates, Life Sciences (LS), Physical Sciences & Mathematics 
(PSM), and Social & Behavioral Sciences (SBS) were well represented among 
Toolbox participants. Since we are interested in differences among scientific 
branches, we focused our attention on participants in these three fields, excluding 
                                               
10 The raters also coded and compared academic disciplines as well as 
academic branches. The raters agreed on % of cases, but there were too many 
disciplines (many of which were represented by only a few participants) to allow for 
statistical analysis. 
11 In each of these cases, the raters agreed that the difference was intractable 
and both interpretations were plausible. For instance, one participant self-identified 
as “neurobiology,” which the raters agreed could either be Life Sciences or 
Medicine and Health Sciences. 
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participants from other academic fields from analysis. This left us with  
participants ( female). 
For our analysis, we ran the Kruskal–Wallis rank sum test for each of the  
Toolbox prompts.12 To contextualize this test, for each prompt, each of the three 
scientific branches had a median score. The Kruskal–Wallis test examines the three 
medians for each prompt for significant differences. The null hypothesis is that the 
medians are equal (i.e., MdnLS = MdnPSM = MdnSBS). The test includes a calculation 
of the probability (the p-value reported below) of the observed results (or more 
extreme results), given the null hypothesis. If the probability is low enough, then we 
reject the null hypothesis, meaning that at least one median of the three is 
significantly different than the others. A follow-up test reveals which median(s) is 
different. If, however, the probability is not sufficiently low, the null hypothesis is 
not rejected, indicating that responses to this prompt are statistically 
indistinguishable across the three academic branches. The results of the Kruskal–
Wallis test for each prompt are summarized in Table .13  
Prompt n df H p Prompt n df H p 
Motivation 1 257 2 2.02 0.37 Reality 1 256 2 11.32 3.48 x 10-3 
Motivation 2 252 2 6.25 0.04 Reality 2* 243 2 13.08 1.45 x 10-3 
Motivation 3 253 2 8.79 0.01 Reality 3 256 2 2.17 0.34 
Motivation 4 258 2 0.75 0.69 Reality 4* 237 2 35.41 2.05 x 10-8 
Methodology 1 263 2 10.45 5.38 x10-3 Values 1 256 2 1.45 0.48 
Methodology 2* 258 2 17.19 1.85 x 10-4 Values 2 260 2 5.07 0.08 
Methodology 3* 255 2 26.19 2.05 x 10-6 Values 3 252 2 10.90 4.29 x 10-3 
Methodology 4* 256 2 43.86 2.99 x 10-10 Values 4 246 2 5.41 0.07 
Methodology 5 257 2 2.76 0.25 Values 5 243 2 0.41 0.81 
Confirmation 1 254 2 4.79 0.09 Reductionism 1 220 2 6.64 0.04 
Confirmation 2 251 2 1.36 0.51 Reductionism 2 248 2 2.59 0.27 
                                               
12 Since our data are not normally distributed, we did not run a series of 
ANOVAs.  
13 For each prompt, we excluded “I don’t know” or “N/A” responses. As is 
apparent in the n column of Table , typically few participants were excluded, 
ranging from only  to  (out of  total). 
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Confirmation 3* 260 2 18.44 9.91 x 10-5 Reductionism 3 250 2 1.42 0.49 
Confirmation 4 252 2 2.52 0.28 Reductionism 4 256 2 6.65 0.04 
Confirmation 5 255 2 3.41 0.18 Reductionism 5 256 2 6.14 0.05 
Table . Results from Kruskal–Wallis tests for each of the Toolbox prompts. 
Prompts marked with asterisks (*) are significant after applying the Holm-
Bonferroni method for correcting for familywise error.  
Because the STEM instrument was not designed to detect particular 
differences, we should be mindful of the familywise error rate associated with 
multiple testing. In effect, we are not testing a single hypothesis, but rather  
hypotheses simultaneously. The danger in testing multiple hypotheses 
simultaneously is that it increases the probability of a false positive—a Type I error. 
When testing a single hypothesis, the threshold for a significant p-value is often set 
at ., representing a % chance for a Type I error. If, however, the same threshold 
of . were applied separately for each of the  tests here, then the familywise 
error rate (i.e., the likelihood of at least one false positive) is approximately .. So 
some form of correction is called for; we employed the Holm-Bonferroni method 
(Holm ), which is a stepwise algorithm that lowers the p-value required to reject 
a null hypothesis. Using this method, we find significant results for six of the 
prompts (marked with an asterisk in Table ): Methodology , Methodology , 
Methodology , Confirmation , Reality , and Reality . Three additional prompts 
were very close to significant after correction: Reality , Methodology , and Values 
.14 Since the Holm-Bonferroni method is a fairly conservative means of correcting 
for familywise error, we have included these three for follow-up analysis along with 
the other six. But these results in particular should be taken tentatively. 
The Kruskal–Wallis tests found significant or nearly significant differences 
among the three branches of science for nine prompts. To determine where the 
                                               
14 The p-values for each of these three prompts exceeded the threshold for 
significance set by the Holm-Bonferroni correction by less than 0.003. We 
therefore included these three prompts in our follow-up analyses, where we found 
significant differences across the scientific branches. These results should be taken 
tentatively and are included primarily to suggest future lines of research.  
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differences reside, for each of these prompts we conducted follow-up analyses using 
the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test. This is a pairwise test, comparing the 
medians of two groups. In this case, for each prompt, three MWW tests are 
conducted, one for each comparison (LS and PSM, LS and SBS, and PSM and 
SBS). Results of all MWW tests for the nine prompts are summarized in Table  
(Appendix). 
. Reality 
For the Reality prompts, the initial Kruskal–Wallis tests found significant 
results for Reality  and , and Reality  was close. All of these results were borne 
out by the follow-up MWW tests (Figure ). Researchers in Life Sciences and 
Physical Sciences & Mathematics were significantly were more likely to agree with 
Reality  (“Scientific research aims to identify facts about a world independent of 
the investigators”) than those in Social & Behavioral Sciences (LS & SBS: U = 
., p = . x -, r = . and PSM & SBS: U = ., p = ., r = .). 
However, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics were not statistically 
distinguishable. For Reality  (“Scientific claims need not represent objective reality 
to be useful”), only between Life Sciences and Social & Behavioral Sciences was 
the difference statistically significant (U = ., p = . x -, r = .). As Figure 
 shows, the mean for Physical Sciences & Mathematics was between the other two, 
although its differences with the other two branches were not statistically 
significant. For Reality  (“The subject of my research is a human construction”), 
life scientists and physical scientists and mathematicians were less willing to agree 
with this prompt than were social and behavioral scientists (LS & SBS: U = ., 
p = . x -, r = . and PSM & LS: U = , p = . x -, r = .). Again, 
Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics were statistically 
indistinguishable, which is a pattern repeated below.  
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Figure .15 Summary of means by scientific branch for the Reality , , and  
prompts  
. Methodology 
Next we conducted follow-up analyses for Methodology  (“Scientific research 
(applied or basic) must be hypothesis driven”), Methodology  (“In my disciplinary 
research, I employ primarily quantitative methods”), Methodology  (“In my 
disciplinary research, I employ primarily qualitative methods”), and Methodology 
 (“In my disciplinary research, I employ primarily experimental methods”). 
Beginning with Methodology , life scientists and physical scientists and 
mathematicians were more willing to agree that science must be driven by 
hypotheses than were social and behavioral scientists (U = , p = ., r = . 
                                               
15 All figures use the colorblind-friendly palette developed by Okabe & Ito 
(2002).  
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and U = , p = ., r = . respectively).16 Again, Life Sciences and Physical 
Sciences & Mathematics were statistically indistinguishable (Figure ).  
 
Figure . Summary of means by scientific branch for the prompts Methodology -.  
Methodology  and  concern quantitative and qualitative methods, 
respectively, and so can be discussed together. Both exhibit the previously observed 
pattern, where there is no significant difference between Life Sciences and Physical 
Sciences & Mathematics but both differed from Social & Behavioral Sciences. 
Specifically, researchers in the Social & Behavioral Sciences are less inclined than 
researchers in the other two branches to employ quantitative methods (U = , p 
= . x -, r = . and U = ., p = . x -, r = .) and more inclined 
to employ qualitative methods (U = ., p = . x -, r = . and U = , p 
                                               
16 Recent qualitative analysis of Toolbox dialogues supports this point 
(Shannon M Donovan, O’Rourke, and Looney 2015). 
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= . x -, r = .). Methodology  is the only prompt where all three branches 
are significantly different from one another. Life scientists were most likely to report 
employing experimental methods, followed by the physical scientists and 
mathematicians, and the social and behavioral scientists were the least likely to rely 
on experimentation.  
. Confirmation and Values 
Finally, we consider the Confirmation and Values modules. Since only one prompt 
in each module was identified by the Kruskal–Wallis tests as requiring follow-up 
analysis, we present them together. As Figure  shows, the pattern of results is 
similar for these two prompts. Confirmation  (“Validation of evidence requires 
replication”) suggests that the demand for replication in the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences is significantly lower than in the Life Sciences (U = ., p = . x -, 
r = .) or Physical Sciences & Mathematics (U = ., p = ., r = .). With 
respect to Values  (“Value-neutral scientific research is possible”), social and 
behavioral scientists were less willing to endorse the possibility of value-neutral 
science than life scientists (U = , p = ., r = .) and physical scientists and 
mathematicians (U = ., p = ., r = .). Future research on this topic is 
particularly recommended. In both cases, Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & 
Mathematics were statistically indistinguishable.  
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Figure . Summary of means by scientific branch for the Confirmation  and Values 
 prompts.  
 Discussion 
In this section, we dig more deeply into our results by first addressing a concern 
about how we interpret participants’ responses. We then turn to the project of 
distinguishing the natural and the social sciences. Finally, we consider the 
implications these results have for the ongoing conversation within philosophy of 
science about interdisciplinary integration. 
. Addressing a methodological worry 
As we adumbrated above, our strategy has been to probe for philosophical 
differences among scientific branches by examining the philosophical commitments 
1
2
3
4
5
Confirmation 3 Values 3
Prompt
Lik
er
t S
co
re
 A
gg
re
ga
te
 M
ea
ns
Scientific Branch
Life Sciences
Physical Sciences
& Mathematics
Social & Behavioral
Sciences
Differences in Views on
Confirmation and Values by Scientific Branch
 22 
or attitudes of scientists who belong to these branches, as indicated by their 
responses of agreement and disagreement with Toolbox prompts. For nine prompts, 
we have found reason to think that scientists in different branches tend to respond 
differently. We might be inclined to draw a number of immediate conclusions from 
these findings. For example, we might be inclined to say that social and behavioral 
scientists disagree with life scientists, physical scientists, and mathematicians about 
whether value-neutral scientific research is possible. However, for reasons raised by 
an anonymous referee and mentioned in note , we need to proceed slowly.  
For our four findings that involve reflexive prompts (viz., Methodology , , 
, and Reality ), respondents are expressing attitudes about propositions that 
involve reference to themselves. In these cases, we cannot say that participants 
disagreed since the propositions to which they are responding differ. Nevertheless, 
we can note the differences. Social and behavioral scientists differ, for instance, to 
the extent to which they “employ primarily qualitative methods” in their disciplinary 
research. The remaining five prompts concern science understood more broadly, and 
so it is possible that representatives of the scientific branches disagree with one 
another about these, so long as they are interpreting the propositions in the same way, 
e.g., as claims about science in general. However, it might be that the participants 
are responding to the prompts in a way that reflects their particular scientific field, 
e.g., social science or natural science. So, a social scientist would interpret Values  
as a claim about value-neutral social science, whereas a physical scientist would 
interpret it as a claim about value-neutral natural science. In this case, the 
propositions differ, and so we could not conclude that different responses indicate 
disagreement.  
We acknowledge that for the five non-reflexive prompts that support 
branch-level differences, our data do not rule out the possibility that participants 
are interpreting them differently. We are, however, reasonably confident that the 
participants interpreted these prompts in a non-localized and more general way, for 
three reasons. First, before the Toolbox workshop, participants were asked to read 
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(Eigenbrode et al. 2007), which places the Toolbox approach, and thereby the 
workshop, in the context of a wide range of possible scientific contributions to 
interdisciplinary research. Second, prior to responding to the prompts, participants 
heard a preamble from their workshop facilitator that motivates the workshop as a 
response to communication issues that arise in interdisciplinary collaborations 
involving representatives of potentially any subset of scientific disciplines. Third, 
typical workshops involve representatives of several disciplines. Often the 
disciplines are epistemically distant (e.g., sociology and microbiology). The 
preamble aims to make it clear that the dialogue is intended to highlight similarities 
and differences across the disciplines represented in the room. Considered together, 
these factors encourage an orientation on the part of the participant toward science 
in general, an orientation that it is reasonable to think carries over to the 
interpretation of the non-reflexive prompts.  
But, even if we are wrong and participants tended to interpret the non-
reflexive prompts more locally, our principal conclusion about philosophical 
differences across scientific branches still holds. Although we are interested in 
whether or not the participants agree about the issues expressed by these prompts, 
our primary interest is in using our data to illuminate relationships among scientific 
branches. We maintain that this second broad conclusion follows whether the 
scientists involved tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms of science 
in general or their scientific fields in particular. To see this, assume first that the 
participating scientists tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms of 
science in general. Again, we found that a subset of these prompts gave rise to 
responses that tended to differ across scientific branches. On the current 
assumption, they are thus prompts give rise to cross-branch disagreements. This is 
a finding in need of an explanation. One reasonable explanation is that the 
disagreements stem from different views about science in general that reflect 
experiences of scientific branches that tend to differ in exactly these ways. On this 
assumption, what our results give us, then, is an indirect indication of what the 
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Social & Behavioral Sciences, Life Sciences, and Physical Sciences & Mathematics 
are like.  
Now suppose that the previous assumption is wrong. Assume that the 
participating scientists tended to interpret the non-reflexive prompts in terms of 
their respective fields. This could be more general, like social science or natural 
science, or more specific, like sociology or physics. In this case, there is an even 
more direct path from their Toolbox responses to conclusions about their scientific 
branches. If social scientists say P about social science and natural scientists say ~P 
about physical science, we should conclude that because social scientists are the best 
sources of insight into social science and natural scientists into physical science that 
P can be used to differentiate social science and natural science. Thus, either way, 
we are able to infer conclusions about their scientific branches from their Toolbox 
responses, which is the key conclusion we wish to draw from our data and the 
conclusion that will inform the rest of this Discussion section. 
.  A closer look 
There are a number of points to make about our results. First, they revealed little 
difference between Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & Mathematics. There was 
a statistically significant difference between them on only one prompt, 
Methodology . Otherwise, the two branches were indistinguishable. Only Social 
& Behavioral Sciences could be distinguished from one or both of the other 
scientific branches. On the assumption that Life Sciences and Physical Sciences & 
Mathematics qualify as natural sciences, differences like those reported here could 
help confirm philosophical accounts of what distinguishes the natural sciences from 
the social sciences. Consider Hacking’s account, introduced above. According to 
this account, the social sciences differ from the natural sciences because the 
classificatory practices of the social sciences interact with the world differently than 
the classificatory practices of the natural sciences. If this is true, then social scientists 
would have greater exposure than natural scientists to the makings of a prima facie 
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consideration against one of the pillars of scientific realism—the metaphysical claim 
that the sciences investigate a mind-independent world. As such, it wouldn’t be too 
surprising to find social scientists more inclined toward antirealist attitudes about 
science than natural scientists. Our results with respect to Reality 1, 2, and 4 
correspond to this expectation, thereby lending credence to Hacking’s theory. 
Further, our results provide some reason to think that Life Sciences and 
Physical Sciences & Mathematics are similar with respect to replication, value-
neutrality, the role of hypotheses, and quantitative methods. Individually, these 
results are what we would expect—that both would be more inclined to use 
quantitative rather than qualitative methods, for example—but taken together, they 
contribute to an increasingly detailed map of philosophical common ground they 
share with one another but not with the Social & Behavioral Sciences, and this 
helps motivate philosophical efforts to distinguish natural and social sciences. 
Further research is warranted to fill out this map, as well as explore where there 
might be philosophical differences between the two branches (e.g., the role of 
experimentation). 
A second point to make about our results stems from our finding that social 
and behavioral scientists were less willing to agree that value-neutral scientific 
research is possible (Values , M = ., S = .) than life scientists (M = ., SD 
= .) and physical scientists and mathematicians (M = ., SD = .). This 
difference might be due to a greater appreciation by scientists in the Social & 
Behavioral Sciences than in the other branches for the roles that values play in 
science—especially non-epistemic values. Such a hypothesis is a ripe topic for future 
research.17 This is not to say that there was widespread endorsement for the 
possibility of value-neutral science in the other branches; the means for both 
                                               
17 For related empirical work on this topic, see Reiners et al. (2013), who 
focus on values in ecology.  
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branches were very close to the midpoint of the scale.18 Nevertheless, as Steel et al. 
() argue, the absence of an endorsement for value-neutral science suggests that 
philosophers of science should not assume, in building their normative theories 
about science or in developing their normative interventions for improving science, 
that scientists endorse the “value-free ideal,” according to which good science is 
science that is not influenced by non-epistemic human values (Douglas ). 
Furthermore, on the reasonable assumption that many scientists understand 
value neutrality to be one form that scientific objectivity can take, our results suggest 
that further empirical study is warranted to investigate if scientists’ responses to 
issues related to scientific objectivity are mediated by their views on value-neutral 
science. This suggestion is motivated, in part, by Reiss and Sprenger (), who 
contend that:  
[m]any central debates in the philosophy of science have, in one way 
or another, to do with objectivity: confirmation and the problem of 
induction; theory choice and scientific change; realism; scientific 
explanation; experimentation; measurement and quantification; 
evidence and the foundations of statistics; evidence-based science; 
feminism and values in science.  
For example, as an initial conjecture, it might be that scientists who reject value-
neutrality would be less likely to require replication for confirmation. After all, 
rejecting value-neutrality suggests an openness to methods for evaluating scientific 
                                               
18 If the participants do not know how to respond to the prompts or are 
uncertain, they can select the response option “Don’t Know”. Each module 
contained an additional prompt focusing on the similarity of the group’s views in 
that module (which we’ve omitted from analysis for this paper). For these 
prompts, 80 to 132 participants responded, “Don’t Know.” Additionally, for the 
Reductionism 1 prompt, 40 participants also responded, “Don’t Know.” The 
availability of this option and its regular use increases our confidence that means 
near the midpoint can be interpreted as “neither agree nor disagree.” 
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research that are sensitive to value differences, and such methods could permit 
variation in acceptable results that is inconsistent with the replication standard.  
We note two caveats. First, our findings are preliminary and are based on a 
data set too small to provide resolution at the level of individual scientific disciplines. 
Given this limitation, it remains possible that the philosophical views of scientists 
correlate with scientific disciplines and we missed this, detecting only occasional 
correlations between branches and philosophical views. Second, it should be noted 
that the prompts in the STEM instrument are not validated using psychometric 
techniques. Their original purpose is to promote dialogue among collaborators, and 
to this end, they occasionally embed vague or ambiguous terminology designed to 
tease out unacknowledged differences in conceptualization among collaborators 
during a dialogue structured by their responses to these prompts. For example, 
Reality  includes the term “human construction,” which allows for multiple 
interpretations. A sociologist might agree with this prompt, thinking the subject of 
their research (e.g., government, money) would not exist without humans, while an 
engineer might agree with it thinking that the subject of their research (e.g., 
bridges) are constructed by humans. Further research designed to build on these 
preliminary findings should seek to collect attitude data with prompts that are 
immune to this sort of concern.  
. Experimental data, philosophy of science, and interdisciplinary integration 
We conclude our discussion by considering several implications our results have for 
integration in philosophy of science, and especially interdisciplinary integration. 
Interdisciplinarity is a “powerful trend in contemporary science” (Mäki , ) 
that involves the integration of distinct disciplinary explanations, data, standards, 
and methods (Brigandt ). This type of integration is also recognized as a key 
part of responses to the “Grand Challenges” facing humanity (Grandis and 
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Efstathiou ).19 As such, it is a topic that has garnered increased attention from 
philosophers of science, especially those interested in interdisciplinarity, biology, or 
cognitive science (Bermúdez ; Brigandt , ; Griesemer ; Grune-
Yanoff ; Holbrook ; Leonelli ; O’Rourke, Crowley, and Gonnerman 
; O’Rourke ). 
Our empirical work positions us to make three contributions to the 
philosophical understanding of interdisciplinary integration in the sciences. Each 
can be seen as contributing to the philosophical task described by Brigandt: “to 
understand what [integration] involves, how integrative practices operate, how 
integrative accounts are formed, and what the challenges and limits to integration 
are” (2013, 461–62) . First, although philosophy can profit from the interaction of 
different disciplines in interdisciplinary research (Crowley, Gonnerman, and 
O’Rourke 2016), we have argued that philosophy can also be a source of conceptual 
differences that challenge interdisciplinary integration (Eigenbrode et al. 2007). 
Our work serves as an empirical contribution to the task of better understanding 
what this challenge looks like in particular collaborative contexts. Specifically, our 
findings reveal some of the contours of an emerging map of philosophical attitudes 
about science. While parts of the map remain obscured, our results indicate that 
social and behavioral scientists differ methodologically from biophysical scientists 
in several ways (Methodology 1-4). They are also inclined to be suspicious of the 
value-free ideal (Values 3), naïve realism about the external world (Realism 4), and 
objectivity as a regulative ideal (Realism 1 & 2). Biophysical scientists differ among 
themselves in terms of how reliant they are on experimentation (Confirmation 3). 
It is reasonable that these differences represent specific differences among branches 
                                               
19 For example, an interdisciplinary account of the risks posed by 
geoengineering, such as solar radiation management projects, would require the 
synthesis, or integration, of inputs from the earth sciences, sociology, economics, 
and philosophy (Tuana et al. ). Although interdisciplinary research does not 
require collaboration, it is often collaborative due to the need for a rich variety of 
inputs and a sensitivity to the range of disciplinary constraints on integration. 
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of science. Interdisciplinary teams that include representatives of these scientific 
branches may need to negotiate these differences if their collaboration is going to 
function well (Lélé and Norgaard 2005). The methodological differences may 
appear unsurprising, they are not trivial in the context of interdisciplinary research 
teams trying to develop an integrated methodology. Navigating the differences can 
often become quite challenging (Eigenbrode et al. 2007; O’Rourke and Crowley 
2013). The same can be said for the value-neutral ideal. It can’t be determined prima 
facie which differences will be trivial or formidable in the life of an interdisciplinary 
research team.  
A second point that our empirical work positions us to make about 
interdisciplinary integration relates to the challenge of integrating across the natural 
science/social science divide (Barthel and Seidl 2017; Lélé and Norgaard 2005). 
According to Rylance, interdisciplinarity that attempts to integrate “distant” 
disciplines is “more complex to undertake” (2015, 314). As a first approximation, it 
is reasonable to take disciplines in the Social & Behavioral Sciences branch to be 
more “distant” from those in, say, the Life Sciences than any two disciplines in the 
Social Sciences or in the Life Sciences would be from one another; this is suggested, 
after all, by their classification in different academic branches. Our results provide 
empirical support for this metric, highlighting a number of conceptual dimensions 
along which the social sciences differ from the natural sciences. When disciplines 
from these branches collaborate, the distance between how they conceptualize and 
practice science makes the common ground necessary to support interdisciplinary 
integration (Klein 2012) more difficult to come by, which could explain why these 
collaborations are more complex. In no small part, how one tends to conceptualize 
and practice science is grounded in one’s philosophical attitudes about science, 
including one’s core beliefs about the nature of science and the world and 
differences in operative values about scientific practice. 
A third and more speculative point is that our results provide some reason 
to think that differences among the philosophical attitudes of scientists are not 
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neatly partitioned into academic branches. There is considerable variability within 
branches—see the standard deviation values in Table 4 (Appendix)—suggesting 
that considerable differences in philosophical attitudes may exist within related 
disciplines. When we speak of interdisciplinary research projects, we talk about 
inter-disciplinary integration. But maybe discipline is best viewed as a proxy variable 
for a host of factors that individual researchers bring into the project. After all, 
scientists don’t integrate disciplines when engaging in interdisciplinary integration; 
rather, they integrate methods, data, or perspectives as practiced, supplied, or 
championed by individuals. They seek individual agreement with decisions that 
combine perspectives in complex, often sui generis ways (Klein 2012). Differences 
in core beliefs and values, including those pertaining to science and its practice, may 
partition at the level of discipline in interesting ways, but it is also possible that in 
any collection of collaborators—even those that might seem like “unidisciplinary” 
collaborations—the differences in core beliefs and values among the individuals 
represent obstacles to meaningful integration. So, in short, by focusing on 
disciplines in interdisciplinary integrations, we may be looking in the wrong place—
perhaps the really important differences do not aggregate at the disciplinary level. 
 Conclusion 
Our examination of Toolbox data revealed differences in how scientists from 
different branches of science reacted to philosophical claims about aspects of 
scientific practice. In total, these results suggest that distinctions among branches 
of science are correlated with interesting philosophical differences. These differences 
concern attitudes toward realism, objectivity, replication, values, hypotheses, and 
methods. Since our results are preliminary, further experimental research in the 
philosophy of science is warranted to explore the scope and nature of these 
differences, as well as the extent to which these differences are responsible for deeper 
differences among ways of practicing science.  
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These results make two contributions to the burgeoning field of 
experimental philosophy of science. First, reflection on our results, and especially 
their bearing on recent work on scientific integration, provides an argument by 
example for the validity and effectiveness of experimental philosophy of science. 
These results help to reinforce philosophical conclusions about scientific integration 
derived through non-experimental means (e.g., the claim that integration across the 
natural/social divide can be especially challenging to achieve). In this way, 
experimental philosophy of science can provide a line of converging evidence in 
support of extant views in philosophy of science. Second, our results show that 
experimental philosophy of science can also suggest insights into science that may 
be harder to gain through non-experimental means, e.g., that philosophical 
differences across individuals may be more of an obstacle to interdisciplinary 
integration than cross-disciplinary differences. 
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Appendix 
  Comparison U p r 
Reality 1 
LS-PSM 4939 0.29 0.07 
LS-SBS* 4776.5 9.52 x 10-4 0.24 
PSM-SBS* 2432.5 0.03 0.20 
Reality 2 
LS-PSM 3351 0.07 0.13 
LS-SBS* 2364.5 3.79 x 10-4 0.26 
PSM-SBS 1469 0.08 0.16 
Reality 4 
LS-PSM 3409 0.69 0.03 
LS-SBS* 1698.5 2.70 x 10-9 0.43 
PSM-SBS* 875 2.90 x 10-6 0.42 
Confirmation 3 
LS-PSM 4888.5 0.54 0.04 
LS-SBS* 5309.5 1.42 x 10-5 0.31 
PSM-SBS* 2656.5 0.002 0.27 
Values 3 
LS-PSM 4474.5 0.78 0.02 
LS-SBS* 4639 0.002 0.23 
PSM-SBS* 2586.5 0.006 0.24 
Methodology 1 
LS-PSM 4950 0.75 0.02 
LS-SBS* 4949 0.002 0.22 
PSM-SBS* 2627 0.009 0.23 
Methodology 2 
LS-PSM 4400.5 0.61 0.04 
LS-SBS* 5052 1.10 x 10-4 0.28 
PSM-SBS* 2648.5 3.99 x 10-4 0.31 
Methodology 3 
LS-PSM 4352 0.78 0.02 
LS-SBS* 2109.5 3.87 x 10-7 0.36 
PSM-SBS* 1170 5.91 x 10-5 0.35 
Methodology 4 
LS-PSM* 5472.5 0.01 0.18 
LS-SBS* 5880 2.00 x 10-11 0.47 
PSM-SBS* 2733.5 1.37 x 10-5 0.38 
Table . Summary of results for the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW) test for 
the nine prompts suggested for further analysis by the Kruskal–Wallis tests. 
Comparisons marked in bold and with asterisks show significant differences.  
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Table . Summary of means and standard deviation by prompt 
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